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 1 
PERSONALIZATION AND STREET-LEVEL PRACTICE IN ACTIVATION: THE 2 
&$6(2)7+(8.¶6:25K PROGRAMME 3 
VANESA FUERTES & COLIN LINDSAY 4 
 5 
ABSTRACT 6 
 7 
This article discusses factors shaping street-OHYHOFDVHZRUNHUV¶UROHLQWKHµSHUVRQDOizaWLRQ¶RI8 
activation for people with employability and health-UHODWHGEDUULHUVWRZRUN5LFH¶V9 
micro-institutionalist framework understands street-level bureaucracy as being defined across 10 
three levels: interactions between caseworkers and clients; the environment of the 11 
implementing organization that shapes, and is shaped by, these interactions; and the 12 
relationship between these two levels of interaction and the wider economic, policy and 13 
social context. While building on the foundations laid by previous scholars, wHXVH5LFH¶V14 
framework as the starting point for a preliminary study of street-level bureaucrats¶UROHLQ15 
compulsory activation. We analyse in-depth interviews with caseworkers and clients involved 16 
LQWKH8.*RYHUQPHQW¶VPDLQDFWLYDWLRQSURJUDPPH± µThe Work Programme¶. Our findings 17 
support other studies and add to the literature by suggesting that a number of organizational 18 
and high-level policy factors have contributed to an increasing standardization of street-level 19 
practice.   20 
  21 
2 
 
INTRODUCTION 1 
 2 
Successive governments in the UK ± as in many other advanced welfare states ± have 3 
acknowledged the need for more tailored and personalized active labour market (hereafter 4 
µDFWLYDWLRQ¶SROLFLHVWRDVVLVWSHRSOHexcluded from the labour market to return to work. In 5 
this context, personalization is understood as the tailoring of services to account for 6 
individual FOLHQWV¶ needs, allowing for some degree of user participation and co-production. 7 
Thus, µpersonalization is primarily a way of thinking about services and those who use them, 8 
UDWKHUWKDQEHLQJDZRUNHGRXWVHWRISROLF\SUHVFULSWLRQV«[it involves] starting with the 9 
SHUVRQUDWKHUWKDQWKHVHUYLFH¶(Needham 2011, p. 55).  10 
   11 
Such assistance may be particularly valuable for welfare claimants facing a combination of 12 
employability and health-related barriers. In the UK, the expansion of activation programmes 13 
for this group has been accompanied by increased compulsion and conditionality. But there 14 
remain concerns that those with multiple barriers may require specialist services and 15 
personalized support if attempts to help them to progress toward work are to be effective. UK 16 
policymakers have argued that such personalized support is available through the main 17 
activation programme, µThe Work Programme¶ (WP), which is compulsory for many welfare 18 
claimants. +RZHYHUWKHµambiguity and elasticity¶RISHUVRQDOL]DWLRQDVDFRQFHSWKDVEHHQ19 
acknowledged (Needham 2011, p. 54), and concerns have been raised that a reliance on 20 
contracting-out the WP to mainly for-profit providers militates against the realization of 21 
personalized services (Lindsay et al. 2014).   22 
 23 
One way of engaging with these issues involves exploring the practice of street-level 24 
caseworkers who deliver services to clients mandated to participate in activation. This 25 
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approach is useful given that previous studies of street-level bureaucracy have emphasized 1 
the importance of discretion in shaping how policy is delivered at the frontline. The street-2 
level bureaucracy literature is also concerned with the factors that facilitate and/or constrain 3 
the scope for discretion and personalization. These debates provide the focus for this article. 4 
:HGUDZXSRQ5LFH¶VPLFUR-institutionalist framework for exploring street-level 5 
policy implementation in the field of activation to analyze the results of in-depth interviews 6 
with caseworkers and clients within the WP. In this small-scale, exploratory study, we sought 7 
to add to the existing literature and develop new research themes on the extent to which 8 
FDVHZRUNHUV¶LQWHUDFWLRQVZLWKFOLHQWVDPRXQWWRDSHUVRQDOL]HGIRUm of service provision, 9 
and how organizational factors and the broader systemic context constrain or facilitate 10 
caseworker discretion and personalization.   11 
 12 
Following this introduction, we outline the theoretical ground for our research ± debates 13 
around street-OHYHOEXUHDXFUDWV¶UROHLQGHOLYHULQJSHUVRQDOL]HGDFWLYDWLRQ ± and outline a 14 
micro-institutionalist framework for considering factors that shape street-level practice. Next, 15 
we describe the activation policy, organizational and governance environments that provided 16 
the context for our research, followed by our methodology. We then report our findings, 17 
before finally reviewing key themes from the research and their implications.  18 
 19 
PERSONALIZATION AND STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY IN ACTIVATION 20 
 21 
Street-level bureaucrats are defined by Lipsky (1980, p. 3) as µSXEOLFVHUYLFHZRUNHUVZKR22 
interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs and who have substantial discretion 23 
in the execution of their work, [and who] grant access to government programmes and 24 
SURYLGHVHUYLFHVZLWKLQWKHP¶ Discretion is defined here as the tension between flexibility 25 
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and uniformity (Loyens and Maesschalck 2010); the area or space of autonomy where choice 1 
is exercised by those delivering frontline services. Exercising discretion is seen as a defining 2 
feature of street-level EXUHDXFUDWV¶practice for a number of reasons: as a means of 3 
HVWDEOLVKLQJURXWLQHVWKURXJKZKLFKSXEOLFVHUYDQWVFDQµFRSHZLWKXQFHUWDLQWLHVDQGZRUN4 
SUHVVXUHV¶/LSVN\S[LLthe more general need to balance high levels of demand with 5 
µXQUHVROYDEOH¶UHVRXUFHFRQVWUDLQWV, requiring the rationing of time and effort; the extent of 6 
UHJXODWLRQVJRYHUQLQJVHUYLFHVZKLFKµPD\EHVRYROXPLQRXVDQGFRQWUDGLFWRU\WKDWWKH\FDQ7 
only be enforced or invoked seOHFWLYHO\¶/LSVN\S; street-level workHUV¶own 8 
sense of professional identity, which often assumes substantial autonomy and professional 9 
discretion in decision-making (Watkins-Hayes 2009); and the inability of managers to 10 
supervise multiple, diverse interactions between staff and clients at the frontline (Loyens and 11 
Maesschalck 2010).  12 
 13 
/LSVN\¶VLGHDVRQVWUHHW-level bureaucracy have been applied to analyses of the work 14 
of public service professionals ranging from social workers to teachers (Harrits and Moller 15 
2014). However, as activation programmes have grown in their scale and reach (engaging 16 
groups previously considered economically inactive), there has been renewed interest in how 17 
street-level bureaucracy shapes the delivery of these services (Brodkin 2013). As activation 18 
grew as an agenda, and then an industry, the roles of street-level welfare administrators were 19 
SURJUHVVLYHO\UHGHVLJQHGDURXQGWKHFRPSHWHQFLHVRIµFDVHZRUNHU¶± a holistic professional 20 
able to advise and support clients with the assistance of a range of referral routes. 21 
Accordingly, for %RUJKLDQG9DQ%HUNHOSµWKHUROHRIVWUHHW-level bureaucrats in 22 
realizing policy objectives seems to be increasing, partly as a consequence of decentralization 23 
and growing local discUHWLRQ¶, but also due to policyPDNHUV¶SURPLVHWRSURYLGH24 
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µSHUVRQDOLzHG¶WDLORUHGVXSSRUWLQUHVSRQVHWRWKHcomplex barriers faced by individuals 1 
excluded from the labour market. 2 
 3 
The street-level practice of activation workers is also likely to have been affected by two 4 
trends that have increasingly defined labour market policies across nations, but especially in 5 
µOLEHUDO¶ZHOIDUHVWDWHVVXFKDVWKHUK. The first trend relates to the increasing dominance of 6 
µZRUN-ILUVW¶VROXWLRQVLQWKHcontent of activation programmes; and the second trend relates to 7 
the continued importance of New Public Management (NPM) approaches as a means of 8 
organizing the governance of activation. Next, we develop each of these trends and their 9 
impact on personalization in turn.  10 
 11 
Sol and Hoogtanders (2005, p. 147) have provided what is often cited as a standard definition 12 
of work-first:  13 
 14 
µ:RUN-first programmes seek to move people out of welfare and into unsubsidized 15 
jobs as quickly as possible, and jobsearch itself is a central activity in these 16 
SURJUDPPHV«)RUWKRVHZKRIDLOWRJHWDMREVWUDLJKWDZD\ZRUN-first provides 17 
additional activities directed at addressing those factors LPSHGLQJHPSOR\PHQW«WKH\18 
generally are short-term, closely monitored and either combined with or immediately 19 
followed by additional jobsearch¶ 20 
 21 
Work-first is often contrasted with more human capital-oriented activation strategies that 22 
allow for clients to engage in training and personal development activities, which are seen as 23 
more likely to produce sustained long-term employment outcomes for the most 24 
disadvantaged (Sol and Hoogtanders 2005). The increasing dominance of work-first 25 
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activation in countries like the UK is of interest, because it appears to contradict the rhetoric 1 
of a personalized DSSURDFKWRHQJDJLQJZLWKFOLHQWVVRWKDWFDVHZRUNHUV¶GLVFUHWLRQWRRIIHU2 
individually-tailored support ± or indeed deploy their own routines of practice to arrive at 3 
standardized ways of engaging with different client groups ± may be over-ridden by their 4 
organization¶VQDUURZIRFXVRQPRWLYDWLQJDQGIDFLOLWDWLQJincreased jobsearch and 5 
compelling a quick return to work.  6 
 7 
Beyond the obvious constraints on street-level discretion implied by a singular focus at 8 
policymaker and organizational level on a narrow range of service content, work-first may 9 
also influence how the problems of clients are analyzed by caseworkers. Work-first activation 10 
is informed by an assumption that individual failings ± especially in motivation and 11 
commitment ± are crucial to explaining labour market exclusion (Dias and Maynard-Moody 12 
2007). This explains why work-first content tends to focus on encouraging and compelling 13 
SHRSOHWRµGRPRUH¶7KHDVVXPSWLRQVRIZRUN-first are therefore likely to shape street-level 14 
practice in specific ways, for example through encouraging µstandardized, rapid-paced 15 
SURJUDPPHV¶ underpinned by a focus on achieving quick entries into work (Dias and 16 
Maynard-Moody 2007, p. 198); and in limiting opportunities for caseworkers to direct some 17 
clients towards human capital or health improvement services as part of a more gradual 18 
journey towards work (Ceolta-Smith et al. 2015).  19 
 20 
The second trend identified above relates to the continued importance of NPM as a means of 21 
organizing services in the field of activation, and is exemplified in a number of ways. For 22 
example, the contracting-out of the WP has resulted in the dominance of large, for-profit 23 
organizations as providers of activation (Lane et al. 2013). There is limited state regulation of 24 
the content or quality of provision (Ceolta-Smith et al. 2015) as, in the words of the Minister 25 
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for WelfarH5HIRUPµWKHEODFNER[QDWXUHRIWKHWP means that providers are completely 1 
IUHHWRGHVLJQWKHVXSSRUWWKH\RIIHULQRUGHUWRPD[LPL]HVXFFHVV¶)UHXGS4). An 2 
extensive systems of performance management and targets at the level of contracted 3 
organizations and individual caseworkers is designed to incentivize performance (HoC 2011; 4 
Lindsay et al. 2015). There are again implications for street-level practice. On the one hand, 5 
NPM DSSURDFKHVµLPSOLFLWO\DFFHSWGLVFUHWLRQDVDQLQKHUHQW± at times even necessary ± 6 
IHDWXUHRILPSOHPHQWDWLRQLQDGHYROYHGDQGGHFHQWUDOL]HGSROLF\ZRUOG¶%URGNLQS7 
i254). However, it has also been argued that NPM pressures to hit targets and minimize costs 8 
lead to more standardized (rather than personalized) services and µUHGXFHRSSRUWXQLWLHVIRU9 
GLVFUHWLRQ¶LQFDVHZRUNHUV¶LQWHUDFWLRQVZLWKFOLHQWV*UDQWS 10 
 11 
The two trends discussed above are inter-linked. Work-ILUVW¶VIRFXVRQHDVLO\ specified job 12 
outcomes fits well with NPM practices of intensive performance management, targets, and 13 
µSD\PHQWE\UHVXOWV¶DQGPD\DOVROHDGWRDJUHDWHUUHOLDQFHRQIRU-profit, private sector 14 
providers. All of this matters, because our analysis below points to how the dominance of 15 
work-first and NPM tightly constrains the work of street-level caseworkers, intensifying the 16 
standardization of services. Street-level theory has always pointed to how frontline 17 
caseworkers establish standardized routines and short-cuts as coping strategies. But we argue 18 
that what is happening under initiatives such as the WP is quite different. Street-level practice 19 
QRORQJHUUHIOHFWVFDVHZRUNHUV¶µURXWLQHVRISUDFWLFH¶/LSVN\SEXWUDWKHU, as 20 
argued by Brodkin (2011) in the US context, the rigorous imposition of standardized work-21 
first approaches from the top-down.  22 
 23 
A MICRO-INSTITUTIONALIST PERSPECTIVE ON STREET-LEVEL 24 
ACTIVATION 25 
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 1 
Our research considers the extent to which street-level discretion, and a commitment to 2 
personalized services, have endured within the policy and governance context discussed 3 
above. Rice (2013) argues for a micro-institutionalist model of policy implementation that 4 
conceptually embeds caseworkerV¶ actions within a wider web of organizational, economic, 5 
political and social structures. This matters because such institutions µOHJLWLPL]HFHUWDLQ6 
acWLRQVZKLOHSURKLELWLQJRWKHUV¶5LFHS).  It is important to note that 5LFH¶V 7 
(2013) model builds upon previous analyses of street-level policy implementation ± e.g. 8 
Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003); Dias and Maynard-Moody (2007); Watkins-Hayes 9 
(2009); Loyens and Maesschalck (2010); and especially Scott (1997). 1HYHUWKHOHVV5LFH¶V10 
(2013) model is a particularly good fit for our analysis given its multi-dimensionality and 11 
systematic focus on mapping of the interplay between individual and other factors shaping 12 
street-level practice;  and its application to the specific policy arena ± activation policies 13 
targeting those excluded from the labour market ± that provided the focus for our research. 14 
We also view 5LFH¶VFRPSUHKHQVLYH discussion of a number of factors influencing the 15 
caseworker-client interaction at three different levels ± systemic, organizational, and 16 
individual ± as a useful way in to exploring the views of caseworkers and clients. Thus, while 17 
acknowledging the impoUWDQWZRUNWKDWSUHFHGHGLWZHFRQFOXGHGWKDW5LFH¶V18 
framework was most appropriate for our needs.    19 
 20 
5LFH¶V, p. 1039) micro-institutionalist model suggests that street-OHYHOFDVHZRUNHUV¶21 
PDQDJHPHQWRIWKHLUZRUNDQGKRZWKH\µDSSO\FUHDWLYHO\DGDSWRUXQGHUPLQHIRUPDO22 
SROLF\¶FDQEHVHHQDVDIXQFWLRQRIcaseworker and client interactions and characteristics; 23 
how these interactions are shaped by (and in turn inform) the organizational context within 24 
which activation services are provided; and how these two levels of analysis are in turn 25 
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framed by a broader systemic context for policy implementation.  We now consider briefly 1 
some of the literature that informed, and connects with, this model of exploring street-level 2 
practice.   3 
 4 
Caseworker-client interactions 5 
 6 
Rice (2013) notes that cDVHZRUNHUV¶MXGJHPHQWVKDYHWKHSRWHQWLDOWRLQIOXHQFHWKHLU7 
interaction with, and delivery of services to, their clients. Caseworkers may adopt an 8 
advocacy role, µJRLQJWKHH[WUDPLOH¶and operating rules flexibly to assist clients whom they 9 
judge to be cooperative (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003); or demonstrating a 10 
professional ethos that emphasizes personalization (Skelcher and Smith 2015). On the other 11 
hand, there is evidence of activation workers adopting µDQDGYHUVDULDODSSURDFKWRZRUNLQJ12 
ZLWK>SHUFHLYHG@µKDUGFRUH¶FXVWRPHUV¶)OHWFKHUSThese behaviours by 13 
caseworkers are likely to reflect their RZQµpersonal standards of whether or not someone is 14 
GHVHUYLQJ¶/LSVN\S, personal experiences and core beliefs (Watkins-Hayes 15 
2009), and understandings of ethical decision making (Loyens and Maesschalck 2010). Such 16 
judgements also tend to be socialized through professional identity and perceptions of 17 
organizational values (Watkins-Hayes 2009). 7KXVLWFDQEHDUJXHGWKDWµSURIHVVLRQDOQRUPV18 
ZRUNHUV¶EHOLHIVDQGPRUDOYDOXHVRIIURQWOLQHRIILFHUVDUHLPSRUWDQWGHWHUPLQDQWVRIstreet-19 
OHYHOGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ¶/R\HQVDQG0DHVVFKDOFNS. In summary, we might 20 
QRUPDOO\H[SHFWFOLHQWFKDUDFWHULVWLFVDQGFDVHZRUNHUV¶SURIHVVLRQDOQRUPVDQGMXGJHPHQWVWR21 
result in diverse experiences of activation (Watkins-Haynes 2009). But there is also 22 
consensus that the organizational context is crucial in providing the setting for these norms to 23 
find expression.  24 
   25 
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The organizational context 1 
 2 
For 5LFHSµRUJDQL]DWLRQVKDYHLQVWLWXWLRQDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFVWKHPVHOYHVZKLFK3 
implies that any policy-implementing organization will add its own enabling and restricting 4 
elements to the process [of delivering activation@¶. %URGNLQ¶VSi258) work with US 5 
activation caseworkers concurs that µRUJDQL]DWLRQDOFRQGLWLRQVVXEVWDQWLDOO\DIIHFWWKH6 
SDUDPHWHUVRIFKRLFH«SHUVRQDOSUHIHUHQFHLVQRWLUUHOHYDQWEXWLWLVPHGLDWHGE\7 
RUJDQL]DWLRQDOFRQGLWLRQV¶. Empirical studies of street-level activation have tended to focus 8 
on a number of organizational context factors that shape caseworker practice, such as: 9 
UHVRXUFHFRQVWUDLQWVDNH\WKHPHIRU/LSVN\¶VVHPLQDOVWXG\WKHFRQWHQWDQG10 
objectives of formal policy, which in turn inform organizational priorities; and the 11 
importance of performance management systems. 12 
 13 
First, the resources available within activation provider organizations shape the context for 14 
workload and resource challenges faced by street-level caseworkers. For Lipsky (1980) 15 
resource pressures were important to understanding street-OHYHOEXUHDXFUDWV¶QHHGWRXVH16 
discretion as a coping strategy. Resource limitations also clearly inform one crucial element 17 
of discretion in the practice of activation ± the µcreaming¶ of more able clients, on whom 18 
caseworkers may focus their efforts, balanced by the µSDUNLQJ¶RILHZLWKGUDZDORIVXSSRUW19 
from) those clients judged as less willing and able to make progress (Sol and Hoogtanders 20 
2005). Evaluation evidence from the WP KDVFRQILUPHGWKDWµWKHSULRULWL]DWLRQRIWKHPRUH21 
MREUHDG\SDUWLFLSDQWVRYHUWKRVHZKRDUHOHVVMREUHDG\¶UHPDLQVDFRQVLVWHQWWKHPH1HZWRQ22 
et al. 2012, p. 107). 23 
 24 
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Second, the content of policy and programmes, as understood at the organizational level, will 1 
inevitably set the parameters of street-level practice. -HZHOO¶VFRPSDUDWLYHUHVHDUFK2 
confirmed that caseworker-client interactions tend to bounded by the practicalities of the 3 
range of offerings (i.e. programme content) open to caseworkers and the planned duration of 4 
their interaction with clients. A key argument in the UK literature is that caseworker 5 
discretion is constrained, because activation programme content has been characterized by 6 
increasing homogeneity around work-first interventions such intensive jobsearch activities 7 
(Grant 2013). 8 
   9 
Third, there is evidence that these work-first practices have been enforced by ever more 10 
intrusive NPM performance regimes. While there have been examples of caseworkers 11 
resisting the imposition of performance systems, there are many more cases of street-level 12 
practice tending towards standardized, administrative interactions, partly because of 13 
PDQDJHUV¶preference RISURFHGXUDOµPXVWGR¶DFWLYLWLHVduring performance appraisals (Grant 14 
2013). 15 
 16 
Within US activation, Brodkin SLIRXQGWKDWµOLPLWHGUHVRXUFHVDQGXQUHPLWWLQJ17 
pressure to meet measured dLPHQVLRQVRISHUIRUPDQFH¶OHGWR a reliance on coping strategies 18 
of standardization and triaging (i.e. µcreaming and parking¶). Crucially, Brodkin also found 19 
that caseworkers who wanted to offer more assistance to clients, but were denied resources to 20 
do so, FRXOGGHDOZLWKWKLVFRJQLWLYHGLVVRQDQFHE\HQJDJLQJLQWKHµGHOHJLWLPDWLRQRIFOLHQWV21 
DQGWKHLUGHPDQGVIRUKHOS¶± this led caseworkers to explain activation clLHQWV¶worklessness 22 
DVDIXQFWLRQRIµtheir own personal deficiencies in belief, attitude, or behaviour, not in terms 23 
of their skills, health, family issues, the availability of job opportunities, or the difficulties of 24 
managing work and family in the lower-ZDJHODERXUPDUNHW¶%URGNLQ2011, p. i270). 25 
12 
 
 1 
It is again important to emphasize that, LQOLQHZLWK%URGNLQ¶V86-based research, we 2 
want to argue that the pressure to standardize interventions under the sort of work-first 3 
activation discussed below may prove to be qualitatively different from the routines of 4 
practice ± ZKHUHE\µVWUHHW-OHYHOEXUHDXFUDWVGHYHORSURXWLQHV«DQGWKHLUDJHQFLHVLPSRVH5 
VWDQGDUGL]HGZD\VRISURFHVVLQJSHRSOH¶/LSVN\S± that we have long-understood 6 
as part of street-level bureaucracy. There remains scope for caseworkers¶URXWLQHV to affect 7 
clients¶ DFFHVVWRVHUYLFHVEXWµSHUIRUPDQFHPDQDJHPHQWDOWHUVWKHSURGXFWLRQRISROLF\E\8 
ELDVLQJWKHH[HUFLVHRIGLVFUHWLRQ«VXFKPHDVXUHPHQWFUHDWHVLQFHQWLves to pay attention to 9 
ZKDWLVPHDVXUHGDQGWREHOHVVDWWHQWLYHWRZKDWLVQRWPHDVXUHG¶%URGNLQSAll 10 
of the above leads to the conclusion that street-level practice remains an important aspect of 11 
policy implementation, but that under NPM performance regimes within work-first 12 
programmes, discretion will be subject to much more intensive forms of control and 13 
standardization ± Dµroutine discretion that is constituted by a common set of informal 14 
decision rules that emerge from this street-OHYHOORJLF¶%URGNLQSL As we will 15 
VHHEHORZ%URGNLQ¶V (2011) understanding RIµVWDQGDUGL]DWLRQ¶DVWLJKWO\FRQVWUDLQLQJ16 
caseworkers¶ decision making, is central to our analysis of street-level practice under work-17 
first activation. 18 
 19 
7KHµV\VWHPLFFRQWH[W¶RIZHOIDUHSROLF\LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ 20 
 21 
Both the caseworker-client relationship, and the organizational context within which that 22 
UHODWLRQVKLSRFFXUVLQWXUQFRQQHFWZLWKWKHµSROLWLFDOVRFLDODQGHFRQRPLFFRQGLWLRQVRIWKH23 
ORFDOHQYLURQPHQW¶ZKLFKLVµHPEHGGHGLQDODUJHUHQYLURQPHQW¶LQWHUPV of social, economic 24 
and political context (Rice 2013, p. 1052). $WDEDVLFOHYHOSROLF\PDNHUV¶consensus around 25 
13 
 
work-first reform agendas sets the high level political context that shapes organizational 1 
priorities and then street-level interactions. In welfare states such as the UK, high-level policy 2 
decisions have produced funding regimes and programme content that has embedded work-3 
first activation as the singular supply-side policy response to the labour market exclusion 4 
faced by many communities and groups ± at the street-level this clearly has the potential to 5 
constrain caseZRUNHUV¶discretion.   6 
 7 
We may also seek to understand patterns of street-level practice within a much broader 8 
context of institutional regime legacies. An obvious starting point in the UK case is the 9 
legacy of its µOLEHUDO¶ZHOIDUHUHJLPHGHILQHGLQYHU\EURDGWHUPVE\PRGHVWVocial 10 
protection, extensive means-testing, and the centrality of work rather than a commitment to a 11 
decommodifying welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990). More recent scholarship has sought 12 
to identify much more VSHFLILFµDFWLYDWLRQUHJLPHV¶± Serrano PascuaO¶V, p. 301) 13 
analysis of HLJKW(8VWDWHVDUJXHVWKDWWKH8.¶VLQVWLWXWLRQDODQGODERXUPDUNHWOHJDFLHVSODFH14 
it in a regime µZKHUHWKHPDLQHPSKDVLVLVRQFRHUFLYHDVSHFWV«DQGGHVSLWHWKHSURYLVLRQRI15 
tailored services by personal advisers hinting at a more therapeutic type of intervention, the 16 
ODFNRIIXQGLQJIRUWKLVW\SHRIPHDVXUHPDNHVVXFFHVVIXOLPSOHPHQWDWLRQLPSRVVLEOH¶  17 
 18 
Lastly, to return to a key theme from above, some scholars seek to differentiate between 19 
clusters of policies that belong to distinctive models of activation, with many juxtaposing 20 
work-ILUVWDSSURDFKHVZLWKµKXPDQFDSLWDOGHYHORSPHQW¶ (Sol and Hoogtanders 2005). While 21 
it is acknowledged that elements of both approaches are found in most welfare states, work-22 
first principles appear to have been long-dominant in the UK. The argument might be that 23 
these principles have so dominated understandings of policy and practice that they provide 24 
fundamental limits to how activation is conceptualized, practiced and evaluated.   25 
14 
 
   1 
For Rice (2013), such systemic context factors form a milieu within which organizational 2 
constraints on street-level activation practice emerge. Thus, street-level practice is rooted in 3 
client-caseworker interactions, defined by the attitudes, norms and behaviours of each half of 4 
that relationship; but these interactions in turn must be understood in terms of responses to 5 
organizational resource constraints, policy-driven organizational priorities, and related 6 
performance management regimes; which are in turn shaped by long-stranding institutional 7 
and policy norms that have converged (in welfare states such as the UK) around foundational 8 
principles of work-first activation and NPM governance arrangements.    9 
 10 
CONTEXT AND METHODS 11 
 12 
Context for the research 13 
 14 
Demanding more work-related activity of welfare claimants reporting employability and 15 
health-related barriers has been a shared policy agenda of successive governments since the 16 
early 2000s (Lindsay et al. 2015). The introduction of Employment and Support Allowance 17 
(ESA) as the main disability benefit from 2008 has substantially increased the number of 18 
claimants subject to compulsory activation. A stricter medical assessment ± the Work 19 
Capability Assessment ± has resulted in many people with health and disability-related being 20 
found µILWIRUZRUN¶DQGWUDQVIHUUHGWR the main unemployment benefit, JREVHHNHU¶V21 
Allowance (JSA). There is evidence that these clients ± and many existing claimants of JSA ± 22 
also face a complex combination of employability and health-related barriers to work (Beatty 23 
and Fothergill 2015; Ceolta-Smith et al. 2015).   24 
 25 
15 
 
In 2011, all major UK Government Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) activation 1 
programmes covering both JSA and ESA claimants were amalgamated within the WP. The 2 
WP follows the marketization trend of previous initiatives (Zimmermann et al. 2014). 3 
Eighteen Prime Contractors have been commissioned by the DWP to deliver the programme 4 
across eighteen contract areas. These companies hold contracts in one or multiple contract 5 
DUHDVZKHUHWKH\DUHLQFRPSHWLWLRQZLWKRQHRUWZRRWKHUµ3ULPHV¶7KHILQDQFLDOPRGHO6 
follows the established trend of payment by results contracting: contractors receive an 7 
attachment payment for every client, a job-outcome payment 26 or 13 weeks after entry into 8 
work (depending on user group), and a sustainment payment every four weeks to a maximum 9 
of 13, 20 or 26 payments respectively (again depending on user group) (DWP 2012). There 10 
are more ambitious sustainability targets and payment differentiDWLRQDFFRUGLQJWRFOLHQWV¶11 
age, benefit group and claim duration (with the highest payments for reintegrating long-term 12 
ESA claimants)i.   13 
 14 
Policymakers have argued that a µEODFNER[¶IXQGLQJPRGHOallows Primes the freedom to 15 
personalize services WRFOLHQWV¶QHHGV. The idea was to mitigate some of the shortcomings of 16 
previous NPM arrangements, which were seen as encouraging standardized services as a 17 
result of intensive performance targets (especially in relation to job entry). Nevertheless, it 18 
has been suggested that a WP payment-by-results regime that offers limited up-front funding 19 
means that there remains DQLQFHQWLYHWRWDUJHWµTXLFNZLQV¶WKURXJKZRUN-first interventions 20 
(such as short, relatively inexpensive motivational and jobsearch courses) (Rees et al. 2014).   21 
 22 
Due to limited published data, we lack full detail as to the type of support offered by Primes, 23 
and if the programme offers, as the DWP (2011, p. 2) intended, µmore personalized back to 24 
work support for claimants with the aim of helping them into sustained work¶. 7KH':3¶V25 
16 
 
commissioning guidance encouraged ± but did not require ± Primes to form partnerships with 1 
other specialist providers (such as third sector organizations expert in assisting people with 2 
complex health or employability-related barriers) through subcontracting arrangements (Lane 3 
et al. 2013). Specialist providers have since voiced concerns that the level of subcontracting 4 
is lower than expected (Lane et al. 2013). Information provided by Prime Contractors 5 
suggests that specialist, personalized provision targeting the needs of people with health and 6 
disability-related needs, and other complex barriers, is severely limited (Ceolta-Smith et al. 7 
2015). The severity of the problems faced by many clients, the absence of specialist services, 8 
DQGWKHUHVXOWLQJµSDUNLQJ¶RIWKRVHZLWKmultiple barriers, may help to explain the 9 
disappointing job outcome figures achieved by the programme for those furthest from the 10 
labour market (HoC 2013).  11 
 12 
Methods  13 
 14 
This is a small-scale, exploratory study on the interactions between caseworkers and clients 15 
withLQWKH8.¶VWP. The aim is to develop useful, if limited, insights into the street-level 16 
implementation of the programme, in the hope that we can add to current debates, and that 17 
emerging theories can be tested and validated through future, large-scale research. Data were 18 
collected in one Prime Contractor organization delivering the WP in a large urban area of the 19 
UKii.  In-depth interviews that lasted around 45 minutes were conducted with eight 20 
caseworkers and nine service users/clients, during a three-day period in a private room within 21 
the organization. The data represent LQWHUYLHZHHV¶UHFROOHFWLRQRIDFWLYLWLHVDQGactions and 22 
were analyzed using thematic matrixes. On a few occasions, non-participant observation of 23 
caseworker-client interactions was also possible. Interviews were supplemented by a 24 
17 
 
preliminary analysis of organizational policy and strategy documents. Quotations and 1 
organizational context information has been anonymized so as to protect confidentiality.   2 
 3 
The caseworkerV¶ interview schedule revolved around: professional background and role 4 
within the organisation; the structure of everyday work and content of support, evaluation and 5 
monitoring practices; and experiences of collaboration with other professionals and 6 
organizations. Of the eight WP employees interviewed, half had worked with the 7 
organization for more than two years. All but one were full-time caseworkers; the final 8 
interviewee held line management responsibilities but had worked as caseworker for several 9 
years. Caseworkers dealt with clients at different stages of the WP either classified as closer 10 
to or further from the labour market: two were the first point of contact for clients; two dealt 11 
with clients that were due to leave the WP in a few months; and three supported clients 12 
classified as further from the labour market. In common with many activation caseworkers in 13 
the UK, none of our interviewees had a professional background in social work or 14 
counselling. However, half had substantial previous experience in delivering activation; the 15 
remainder had been involved in the activation sector for less than two years.    16 
 17 
Interviews with clients focused on questions DERXWLQGLYLGXDOV¶ employment histories; 18 
encounters with activation services; views of responsibilities and relationships with 19 
caseworkers; and the impact of both worklessness and activation on confidence, well-being 20 
and employability. Most of the nine clients interviewed self-defined as having health-related 21 
issues (for example, drug addition, depression) as well as a range of other barriers to work. 22 
Most clients were classified as µIXUWKHUIURPWKHODERXUPDUNHW¶E\WKH:33ULPH&RQWUDFWRU 23 
and were classified as long-term unemployed. Four clients were at the end of their two years 24 
18 
 
with the WP, two had been on the programme for one year, and three had been with the 1 
programme for six months or less. 2 
 3 
The range of data gathered allowed us to capture key dimensions of street-level practice 4 
including the range of support available, and the factors shaping clients¶ and caseworkers¶ 5 
interactions and experiences. We explored the extent of personalization by discussing: the 6 
degree of flexibility, discretion and/or standardization in caseworker routines; the range of 7 
support offered; DQGFOLHQWV¶SHUFHStions of choice or compulsion. Below, we use 5LFH¶V 8 
(2013) micro-institutionalist framework as a starting point for a discussion of our findings. 9 
 10 
FINDINGS 11 
 12 
Caseworker-client interactions: client-focused rhetoric, work-first practice  13 
 14 
A recurring feature of our interviews with a diverse group of clients and caseworkers was the 15 
similar ± indeed standardized ± approach applied by caseworkers (irrespective of client 16 
FDWHJRU\µGLDJQRVLV¶RUVSHFLILFFDVHZRUNHUUROHAlmost every client and caseworker 17 
defined their interactions as centred on a repetitive and narrow range of jobsearch activities ± 18 
client-caseworker relationships were clearly rooted in a standardized work-first approach to 19 
activation. Although caseworkers discussed occasional cases of clients considered furthest 20 
from the labour market being signposted to specialist provision, the vast majority of 21 
interactions involved helping clients to polish their CVs RUµPRWLYDWLQJ¶WKHPWRPDNH22 
XQVROLFLWHGVSHFXODWLYHµVFDWWHUJXQ¶job applications by letter, telephone or in person. All 23 
caseworkers described typical interactions with clients as consisting of meetings of less than 24 
30 minutes, usually followed by clients pursuing jobsearch activities alone.  25 
19 
 
 1 
µ7\SLFDOO\,ZLOOKDYHDSSRLQWPHQWVIRUKDOIDQKRXU,WGRHVQ¶WPHDQWKDW,¶OODOZD\V2 
see somebody for half an hour. I might see them for a short period of time or the 3 
ZKROHKDOIKRXU7KHQDIWHUWKDWLWFRXOGEHWKDWWKH\¶UHZRUNLQJRQWKHFRPSXWHUVWKH4 
telephones, going out of the office to hand in CVs, a number of different tasks that are 5 
going to help them into employment.¶ (Caseworker 1) 6 
 7 
We heard of similar practices from other caseworkers. These similar accounts demonstrate 8 
the prevalence of work-first practice. This was corroborated by all the clients interviewed, 9 
who consistently emphasized that the core services they received focused on very basic 10 
support with speculative applications, CV preparation and job interview practice. Evaluations 11 
of the WP (Newton et al. 2012; Lane et al. 2013) have similarly argued that the 12 
personalization achieved by the programme is more µprocedural¶ rather than µsubstantive¶± 13 
there is a degree of discretion in the frequency and amount of support offered, but a little 14 
scope for more intensive or tailored interventions. The type of support offered in the WP 15 
appears to be influenced by the resources available within the programme (see discussion of 16 
organizational context below), but is also informed by a dominant behaviourist understanding 17 
of worklessness, which was sometimes also reflected in caseworkers¶GLVFRXUVHVDURXQG 18 
FOLHQWV¶EDUULHUVWRZRUN. This was apparent when the majority of caseworkers repeatedly 19 
pointed to FOLHQWV¶PRWLYDWLRQDVamong the most important factors in achieving positive job 20 
outcomes.  21 
 22 
µ6RLW¶VDERXWFKDQJLQJDQGFKDOOHQJLQJWKHSHUFHSWLRQVEHFDXVHRIWHQLW¶VWKHFOLHQW23 
WKHPVHOYHVWKDWLVVWRSSLQJWKHPVHOYHVORRNLQJIRUZRUNDQGILQGLQJZRUNWKDW¶VP\24 
experience.¶ (Caseworker 2) 25 
20 
 
 1 
Similar explanations were voiced by many interviewees. These mantras around personal 2 
responsibility and improved motivation as a route to employability appeared to have been 3 
accepted by clients. Clients interviewed were keen to emphasize the importance of personal 4 
responsibility in explaining their predicament (even if they had claimed benefits following ill-5 
health and/or redundancy) and as central to a return to work. 6 
 7 
µ0HRK\HVLW¶VGRZQWRWKHMREVHHNHUEHFDXVHLW¶VXSWR,JRWP\VHOILQWKHSRVLWLRQ8 
,¶PLQLW¶VXSWRPHWRJHWP\VHOIRXWRILW¶ (Client 1) 9 
 10 
This focus on individual explanations concurs with previous findings on street-level practice 11 
under work-first activation (see e.g. Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003; Brodkin 2011). 12 
&DVHZRUNHUV¶FRQFHUQZLWKWKHQHHGWRLQFUHDVHPRWLYDWLRQDQGDFWLYLW\ contrasted with their 13 
much rarer acknowledgements of complex personal or VWUXFWXUDOEDUULHUVWRFOLHQWV¶14 
participation in the labour market (such as substance abuse, ill-health, HPSOR\HUV¶UHOXFWDQFH15 
to recruit people reporting complex barriers, or the lack of accessible and appropriate job 16 
opportunities). This is important because if there is convergence around a single, prominent 17 
explanation of the problem faced by claimants ± i.e. their own motivational and behavioural 18 
deficits ± then this might find expression in a form of street-level practice that focuses almost 19 
entirely on encouraging increased effort in standardized jobsearch activities.  20 
 21 
We did find some evidence of the differences in understanding and attitude towards the client 22 
population identified by previous studies (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003). For 23 
example, some caseworkers exhibited somewhat authoritarian and didactic attitudes towards 24 
clients, with one describing his job role as: 25 
21 
 
 1 
µ7HDFKLQJWKHPWREHUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHPVHOYHV«FRDFKLQJWKHPWREHUHVSRQVLEOH2 
for themselves¶ (Caseworker 1) 3 
 4 
Others were much more likely to use a language of empowerment, expressing an apparently 5 
genuine belief that clients had to be encouraged to take ownership of their own journey back 6 
to work. Nevertheless, our key finding remains that these differences of attitude among 7 
caseworkers appeared to have relatively limited impact on the support offered to clients, 8 
which was consistently rooted in a narrow, standardized form of work-first practice. It should 9 
be acknowledged that given the limitations of the study, these findings can be generalized 10 
only to the adviser role within this specific model of UK work-first activation. Our findings 11 
nevertheless add to recent US-based work by Brodkin (2011) highlighting the impact of NPM 12 
norms in enforcing increasingly standardized street-level practice. 13 
 14 
The organizational context: standardized practice under NPM  15 
 16 
Previous studies have reported a number of recurring themes as to how organizational 17 
contexts shape street-level practice in activation (Dias and Maynard-Moody 2007, Brodkin 18 
2011). We found similar themes around the effect of resource pressures, the limits on 19 
discretion imposed by the ubiquity of work-first content, and the dominance of NPM 20 
governance. 21 
  22 
First, resource limitations clearly informed the standardized, work-first model of activation 23 
that defined virtually all caseworker-client interactions. While the leanness of resourcing for 24 
activation can be seen as a systemic characteristic of liberal welfare states (see discussion 25 
22 
 
below), it remains important to recognize that these systemic factors are translated into a 1 
model of practice at organizational level (in this case defined by lean staffing, short-term 2 
interventions and inexpensive programme content). The daily routines described by 3 
caseworkers appeared to be similar in content and based on turning over high quantities of 4 
standardized client interactions. Caseworkers generally arranged around fifteen to eighteen 5 
meetings per day of no more than thirty minutes each (and in most cases considerably 6 
shorter), based on the assumption that they would actually engage with approximately twelve 7 
clients. This highly structured, µEXV\¶GD\ZDVQHFHVVDU\JLYHQFDVHORDGVRIDURXQG 250 8 
clients. The WP¶VFRQWUDFWXal model and payment structures (systemic factors discussed more 9 
fully below) appear to have µlocked in¶ resource scarcity in Prime Contractor organizations, 10 
with organizational-level resourcing and staffing structures in turn producing standardized 11 
caseworker-client interactions.   12 
 13 
While caseworkers accepted that limited resources and lean staffing provided the context for 14 
interactions with clients, they struggled to engage critically with these issues ± claiming that 15 
programme content was adequate while describing standardized practice; acknowledging the 16 
QHHGIRUDGGLWLRQDOUHVRXUFHVZKLOHTXHU\LQJWKHµUHDOLVP¶RIGHPands for properly-funded 17 
services.  18 
 19 
µI think we could always say there could be more [staff], you know it would be great if 20 
we had it but we have to be realistic. I think we have a good provision of resources in 21 
here. I think it satisfies clients on all parts of the programme¶ (Caseworker 3) 22 
 23 
The street-level bureaucracy literature predicts  that caseworkers will engage in the parking 24 
of more disadvantaged and creaming the most work-ready clients in order to manage 25 
23 
 
workload pressures (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003), and we found some evidence of 1 
such behaviour. While the content of interactions with clients tended to be similar, the 2 
regularity with which meetings occurred varied. Some clients were required to engage in 3 
jobsearch activities at least once per week, while others were interviewed monthly and in 4 
some cases once every three months. It is important to note that caseworkers sometimes 5 
characterized less frequent engagements with clients as evidence of personalization (as well 6 
as a means of parking clients and so managing workload pressures), and very occasionally 7 
offered additional evidence of tailoring interactions through the signposting of 8 
complementary services (such as health condition management programmes).   9 
 10 
µ3HRSOHWKDWDUHDELWIXUWKHUDway, maybe that lack in confidence, I get them to do a 11 
ORWRIRXUKHDOWKZRUNVKRSV«that frees me up time, but also it means that once they 12 
DUHPRUHUHDG\WKHLUDWWHQGDQFHLQFUHDVHVDQGWKH\FDQJREDFNLQWRZRUN¶ 13 
(Caseworker 4) 14 
 15 
Notwithstanding these occasional forays into delivering personalized support, our interviews 16 
generally demonstrated the acceptance of standardized work-first activation as the dominant 17 
model of engaging with a client group that exhibited a diverse range of barriers to work. 18 
Accordingly, while some caseworkers claimed that their work was defined by a high degree 19 
of flexibilLW\WKHUHZDVDQDFFHSWDQFHWKDWDQ\DFWLYDWLRQµRSWLRQV¶RSHQWRFOLHQWVZHUH20 
required to fall within clearly-defined parameters (i.e. organizational and policy priorities 21 
centred on moving clients towards entry into the mainstream labour market as quickly as 22 
possible). In all of our interviews, we raised the potential benefits of alternative services 23 
(such as training, health condition management, counselling, etc.) but advisers consistently 24 
characterized their options as being constrained within a narrow range of work-first 25 
24 
 
interventions. There was some discussion of the need to seek sustainable, long-term job 1 
outcomes for clients (a reflection of organization-level performance indicators) but 2 
caseworkers rarely identified specific interventions that could be expected to produce such 3 
sustained outcomes. Furthermore, when asked about providing a broader range of options to 4 
clients, caseworkers often instead described activities designed to encourage an increase in 5 
the quantity of speculative jobsearch activities. 6 
  7 
µ,IWKH\VD\,ZDQWWRPDNHILYHDSSOLFDWLRQVDZHHN,¶OOHQFRXUDJHWKHPWRPDNH8 
PRUH,GRQ¶WHYHUVD\WRWKHP\RXKDYHWRGRWKLV\RXKDYHWRGRWKDWEXW,KDYHWR9 
PDNHVXUHWKDW,PDNHWKHPDZDUHRIWKHEHQHILWVRIGRLQJPRUHVRWKDW¶VZKDWP\MRE10 
is¶(Caseworker 5)   11 
 12 
Similarly, while clients commended the encouragement provided by caseworkers, their 13 
GHVFULSWLRQVRIWKHVXSSRUWRIIHUHGKLQWHGWKDWµSHUVRQDOL]DWLRQ¶ZDVRIWHQOLPLWHGWRDGYLFH14 
about the specific strategies to be deployed when undertaking yet another raft of speculative 15 
job applications. 16 
 17 
µ7KH\JLYHDQKRQHVWRSLQLRQ<RXNQRZLW¶VLI\RXZDQWWRVD\IRULQVWDQFHDFRYHULQJ18 
letter for a certain establishment whether to go formal or to have it a little bit less 19 
formal or more or less a casual letter, you know....  Even though you roughly have an 20 
LGHD\RXUVHOIEHFDXVH\RXNQRZ,¶YHEHHQOLYLQJLQ[name of city] for quite a few years 21 
QRZVR,NQRZDORWRIWKHSODFHV«EXWLW¶VJRRGWRDOZD\VJHWDVHFRQGRSLQLRQ¶22 
(Client 2) 23 
  24 
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Finally, caseworkers were clearly aware of a range of job entry and sustainability targets that 1 
have been written into WP contracts ± a systemic context factor which was reflected at 2 
organizational-level when converted into individual performance indicators (approximately 3 
5-8 job outcomes per month; and 13-16 weeks sustainability for 75-90 per cent of clients). As 4 
noted above, these targets provided a background to general discussions about (for example) 5 
the value of delivering sustainable job outcomes, but the pressure to achieve these outcome-6 
based performance indicators did not emerge as a consistent theme of our interviews with 7 
caseworkers. At the time of the research, the WP had been underperforming for three years, 8 
so it may be that these pressures (and operational failure) had become normalized.  9 
 10 
Nevertheless, LQOLQHZLWK%URGNLQ¶V86ILQGLQJVwhile there was evidence of 11 
organization-wide performance systems shaping the practice of caseworkers, their dominant 12 
focus seemed to be on processes ± ticking off a specified number of easily quantifiable 13 
activities within a standardized toolbox of interventions: CV-polishing; encouraging 14 
VSHFXODWLYHMREDSSOLFDWLRQVDQGFRPPXQLFDWLQJWKHLGHDWKDWµZRUNV SD\V¶  15 
 16 
µI suppose probably we are looking at the things such as performance targets and you 17 
know the KPIs that support that.... So there are things that we say caseworkers must 18 
do, there must be minimum standards that are met with clients. But we ask them that 19 
because we know it benefits the client, things like have a CV, have a cover letter, 20 
complete a Better Off Calculation so that we know how much better off a person will 21 
be in a part-time job and a full-time job.¶ (Caseworker 3) 22 
 23 
Caseworkers consistently made similar claims ± that their engagements with clients were as 24 
flexible as possible µZLWKLQUHDVRQ¶EXWWKDWLWZDVDSSURSULDWHIRUDWWHPSWVDWSHUVRQDOL]DWLRQ25 
26 
 
to be framed by NPM-type targets that demanded high numbers of repetitive, work-first 1 
activities. It is perhaps understandable that caseworkers sought to cope with the limits to their 2 
discretion by making claims around flexibility while conversely embracing KPIs that validate 3 
standardized processes. As noted above, caseworkers had neither the authority nor the 4 
resources to address the complex barriers to work presented by many WP clients. 5 
 6 
In summary, our findings suggest that resource limitations translated into organizational 7 
practices that drive street-OHYHOEXUHDXFUDWV¶GLVFUHWLRQDU\UDWLRQLQJRIeffort and their 8 
µFUHDPLQJDQGSDUNLQJ¶RIFOLHQWV ± an analysis that is consistent with large-scale evaluations 9 
of the WP (Newton et al. 2012). However, organizational factors ± resource constraints, 10 
KPIs, and an organization-level commitment to delivering a narrowly-defined set of work-11 
first interventions ± appear to have played a key role in severely constraining caseworker 12 
discretion and limiting opportunities for personalization in this case.   13 
 14 
The systemic context: activation within the context of a liberal welfare regime  15 
 16 
Primary research with street-level bureaucrats inevitably demands an element of 17 
extrapolation if we are to consider the systemic pressures that might impact on frontline 18 
practice. However, the systemic context factors highlighted by Rice (2013) and others appear 19 
to be relevant in helping to understand some of the findings discussed above.  20 
 21 
For example, our findings concur with and evidence 6HUUDQR3DVFXDO¶VGHVFULSWLRQRI22 
a UK activation regime where a rhetorical commitment to tailored services is undermined by 23 
a failure at policy and organizational levels to resource genuine personalization. The WP was 24 
contracted-out to mainly for-profit providers, with the decisive selection criteria reflecting 25 
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NPM priorities around minimizing cost (rather than evidencing high quality, personalized 1 
support) (HoC 2013; Rees et al. 2014; Ceolta-Smith et al. 2015). More generally, while the 2 
8.KDVORQJFRQVLGHUHGLWVHOIDµZRUOGOHDGHU¶':32007, p. 20) in compulsory activation, 3 
the resources deployed to provide client services have always been tightly controlled ± UK 4 
spending on active labour market interventions remains well below OECD and EU averages 5 
(ranking 15th in the EU on expenditure as a percentage of GDP) (Martin 2014). It is an 6 
activation regime that prioritizes relatively inexpensive, work-first interventions, and it can 7 
be argued that these systemic norms are reflected in both organization-level factors (lean 8 
staffing models; a limited range of programme content) and client-caseworker interactions 9 
(short-term interactions based around a set of repetitive and inexpensive activities).  10 
  11 
We might also argue that certain governance and policy norms (in this case the mutually 12 
reinforcing themes of work-first programme content and NPM governance) can be seen as 13 
systemically embedded in the UK welfare state, constraining high-level discussion of policy 14 
alternatives and potentially shaping both organizational strategies and street-level practice. 15 
:LJJDQ¶VFRQWHQWDQDO\VLVRIWKH8.SROLF\GLVFRXUVHRQDFWLYDWLRQSRLQWVWRWKH16 
continued dominance of work-first ideas, to the exclusion of considerations of the need for a 17 
broader range of personalized interventions. We might hypothesize that such processes of 18 
policy closure have been reflected in programme content at organizational-level, which 19 
focuses almost entirely on work-first, and that this helps to explain the rather narrow, 20 
standardized interventions that defined many caseworker-client interactions in this case.   21 
 22 
In terms of governance, numerous comparative studies have placed the UK in the vanguard 23 
of the NPM reform movement, and it has been argued that NPM themes around enhancing 24 
managerial control, minimizing discretion and aligning work effort with quantitative KPIs are 25 
28 
 
prominent in the organization of activation services (Rees et al. 2014). While again 1 
acknowledging that it is difficult to evidence a causal link between high-level governance 2 
norms and street-level practice, we might argue that the dominance of NPM has been 3 
reflected in performance management systems and work organization within activation 4 
service providers, in turn shaping and constraining the street-level practice of caseworkers.  5 
  6 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 7 
 8 
6LQFH/LSVN\¶VVHPLQDOZRUNRQVWUHHW-level bureaucracy, an emerging literature has 9 
sought to apply his ideas to specific policy arenas. Rice (2013), building on previous studies, 10 
has provided a useful framework for mapping the potential range of factors shaping street-11 
level interactions in activation. The findings from our exploratory study demonstrate the 12 
potential value of including all three levels of the Rice (2013) model as a starting point for 13 
analyses of street-level practice.  14 
 15 
Perhaps our central, if still preliminary, conclusion relates to the potential relevance of 16 
organizational and systemic factors in accounting for frontline practices and street-level 17 
interactions that have become increasingly standardized, rather than delivering tailored, 18 
personalized services. For the caseworkers and clients participating in our research, the work-19 
first version of personalization amounted to the management of repetitive, standardized 20 
jobsearch activities ± VSHFXODWLYHDSSOLFDWLRQVµWRZKRPLWPD\FRQFHUQ¶OHWWHUZULWLQJDQG21 
CV-polishing. Clients were encouraged to engage in this behaviour during brief encounters 22 
with caseworkers who offered an analysis of LQGLYLGXDOV¶ barriers to work that focused almost 23 
entirely on perceived motivational deficits.  24 
 25 
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Rice (2013) is right to point to both personal values and professional norms as reinforcing 1 
FDVHZRUNHUV¶UDWLRQDOHVIRUWKHLUSUDFWLFH%XWLWappears that in this case, street-level practice 2 
was tightly constrained by an organizational context that demanded standardized, work-first 3 
interactions and imposed severe resource constraints on caseworkers. Within this context, 4 
FDVHZRUNHUVKDGDFFHSWHGWKHQHHGWRµEHUHDOLVWLF¶by engaging in standardized approaches 5 
and accepting a limited range of potential interventions to assist clients. As noted above, the 6 
standardization described by interviewees went well beyond the routines of practice and 7 
client group triaging that are seen as classic coping strategies deployed by street-level 8 
bureaucrats themselves. Rather, standard operating procedures, narrowly-focused programme 9 
content and severe resource limitations appear to have imposed a stricter form of 10 
standardization from the top-down in this case.    11 
  12 
6LPLODUO\WKH130YHUVLRQRISHUVRQDOL]DWLRQLQYROYHGFDVHZRUNHUV¶HYLGHQFLQJof the 13 
completion of a range of pre-programmed activities. One of the tensions inherent in the 14 
dominance of NPM performance systems is that ± contrary to the rhetoric of a focus on 15 
personalized services ± DFWLYDWLRQFDVHZRUNHUV¶practice has increasingly centred on ticking 16 
off standardized processes (Rees et al. 2014). We have seen above that caseworker-client 17 
interactions were often functional and focused on the completion of repetitive tasks. The 18 
relationship between these standardized processes and the sought outcome of sustainable 19 
employment often seemed unclear (or sometimes immaterial) to both caseworker and client. 20 
While caseworkers rarely characterized their practice as being explicitly directed by 21 
SHUIRUPDQFHV\VWHPVWKHGLVFXVVLRQRIµWDUJHWV¶LQUHODWLRQWRVXFKIXQFWLRQDOZD\VRI22 
working suggests that organizational KPIs, rather than professional judgement, were driving 23 
behaviour.   24 
 25 
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We concur with Brodkin (2011) WKDWDQHZDQGGLIIHUHQWIRUPRIµroutinized GLVFUHWLRQ¶KDV1 
emerged, constraining caseworkerV¶VFRSHWRSHUVRQDOL]H interactions. Our research adds to 2 
the literature suggesting that under certain models of NPM-controlled, work-first activation, 3 
standardized practice is increasingly driven almost entirely from the top-down ± something 4 
qualitatively different from /LSVN\¶VSGHVFULSWLRQRIµURXWLQHVDQG5 
VLPSOLILFDWLRQV¶developed by individual street-level bureaucrats µWRDLGWKHPDQDJHment of 6 
FRPSOH[LW\¶ 7 
 8 
Case study research inevitably struggles to evidence directly how systemic factors impact 9 
frontline practice, but we are at least able to consider how the influence of high-level policy 10 
and institutional norms might shape organizational contexts and street-level interactions. For 11 
example, the resource constraints and work-first programme content that dominated our 12 
interviews are not accidental. Rather, these policy priorities have been written into the 13 
activation reforms of successive governments, reflecting the entrenchment of NPM models 14 
that prioritize competition based on cost (Hood and Dixon 2013), and work-first policy 15 
content informed by individualized explanations of worklessness. In turn, we could view 16 
these institutionalized governance and policy norms as in keeping with a liberal activation 17 
regime that long ago µORFNHGLQ¶mechanisms to minimize the costs of supporting those on 18 
benefits while imposing compulsory activities designed to move people into work as quickly 19 
as possible (Serrano Pascual 2007).   20 
 21 
Finally, a few evaluative conclusions are also possible from our research. Given our limited 22 
sample, we are unable to generalize about the extent to which the promise of personalized 23 
activation has been made real under the WP. However, we can report that street-level practice 24 
among the sample of caseworkers within our case study organization appeared increasingly 25 
31 
 
subject to pressures producing standardization. There is a need for further research on 1 
caseworker-client services across UK activation, but if such standardized approaches are 2 
found elsewhere, then this maybe one factor, among others, explaining the WP¶V failure to 3 
achieve job entry targets for people reporting more complex employability and health-related 4 
barriers to work (HoC 2013). Further research would also allow us to test more fully 5 
SROLF\PDNHUV¶FODLPVWKDWWKH\KDYHGHOLYHUHGDpersonalized route from welfare-to-work for 6 
the most disadvantaged ± our preliminary analysis raises doubts about the capacity of 7 
interventions such as the WP to make good on the promise of personalization.  8 
  9 
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 Prime providers will receive a total minimum amount of £3,700 (e.g. £3,800 for a young person) to a total of maximum of 
£13,700 (e.g. for those receiving Employment and Support Allowance in the Support Group and that had recently received 
Incapacity Benefit) 
ii
 The data collection was part of LOCALISE, a Seventh Framework European Commission programme. LOCALISE stands 
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